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Abstract
We study the macroeconomic implications of time-varying precautionary saving
within a general equilibrium model with borrowing constraint and both aggregate shocks
and uninsurable idiosyncratic unemployement risk. Our framework generates limited
cross-sectional household heterogeneity as an equilibrium outcome, thereby making it
possible to analyse the role of precautionary saving over the business cycle in an ana-
lytically tractable way. The time-series behaviour of aggregate consumption generated
by our model is much closer to the data than that implied by the comparable hand-
to-mouth and representative-agent models, and comparable to that produced by the
(intractable) Krusell-Smith (1998) model. (JEL E20, E21, E32)
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1 Introduction
Although precautionary saving against uninsurable income shocks has been widely analysed
theoretically and empirically, it has remained di¢ cult to incorporate into dynamic general
equilibrium models for at least two reasons. First, the lack of full insurance usually produces
a considerable amount of agent heterogeneity, essentially because the wealth of any particular
agent and, by way of consequence, the decisions it makesgenerally depends on the entirely
history of income shocks that this agent has faced (see, e.g., Huggett, 1993; Aiyagari, 1994;
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, 2011). Second, aggregate shocks turn the cross-sectional distribution
of wealth into a time-varying state variable, the evolution of which every agent must forecast
in order to make their best intertemporal decisions. In their pioneering contribution, Krusell
and Smith (1998) have proposed a solution to this problem, which consists in simplifying the
agentss forecasting problem by approximating the full cross-sectional distribution of wealth
with a small number of moments. However, the lack of tractability of the underlying problem
makes their solution method operational only in relatively simple environments; in particular,
both the number of state variables and the support for the exogenous shocks must remain
limited.1
In this paper, we construct a class of heterogenous-agent models with incomplete markets,
borrowing constraints and both aggregate and idiosyncratic labour income shocks than can be
solved under exact cross-household aggregation and rational expectations. More specically,
we exhibit a set of su¢ cient conditions about preferences and the tightness of the borrowing
constraint, under which the model endogenously generates a cross-sectional distribution of
wealth with a limited number of states; exact aggregation directly follows. This approach
makes it possible to derive analytical results and incorporate time-varying precautionary
saving into general equilibrium analysis using simple solution methods including linearisation
and undetermined coe¢ cient methods. In particular, our analysis allows the derivation of a
common asset-holding rule for employed households facing incomplete insurance, possibly
expressed in linear form, which explicitly connects precautionary wealth accumulation to
the risk of experiencing an unemployment spell.2 Additionally, our model can be simulated
1Krusell et al. (2010, p. 1497) refer to this approach as one in which consumers have boundedly rational
perceptions of the evolution of the aggregate state. As mentioned there, the approach is valid under the
conjecture that approximate aggregationholds, so that the forecasting rules used by the agents take the
economy close to the true rational-expectations equilibrium. See Heathcote et al. (2010) for a discussion of
this point and Algan et al. (2010) for a survey of alternative computational algorithms.
2Since a substantial fraction of the households does not achieve full self-insurance in equilibrium (despite
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with several and possibly imperfectly correlatedaggregate shocks with continuous support;
we consider three such shocks in our baseline specication (i.e., technology, job-nding and
job-separation shocks).
In order to isolate, both theoretically and quantitatively, the precautionary motive in
the determination of householdssavings, our general framework incorporates both patient,
permanent-income consumers and impatient consumers who are imperfectly insured and
may face occasionally binding borrowing constraints. Aside from the baseline precautionary-
saving case just discussed, wherein impatient households hold a time-varying bu¤er-stock
of wealth in excess of the borrowing limit, our framework also nests two special cases of
interest: the representative-agent model and the hand-to-mouth model. The representative-
agent model arises as a limit of our incomplete-market model when the economy becomes
entirely populated by permanent-income consumers. The hand-to-mouth model a situation
when impatient households face a binding borrowing limit in every period endogenously
arises when the precautionary motive becomes too weak to o¤set impatience, so that impatient
agents end up consuming their entire income in every period.3 We trace back the strength
of the precautionary motive and thus whether or not impatient households are ultimately
willing to saveanalytically to the deep parameter of the model, most notably the extent of
unemployment risk, the generosity of the unemployment insurance scheme, and the tightness
of the borrowing constraint.
We then use our framework to identify and quantify the specic role of incomplete insur-
ance and precautionary wealth accumulation as opposed to, e.g., mere borrowing constraints
in determining the volatility of aggregate consumption and its co-movements with output. To
this purpose, we calibrate the model so as to match the main features of the cross-sectional
distributions of wealth and nondurables consumption in the US economy in addition to
matching other usual quantities. We then feed the calibrated model with aggregate shocks
to productivity and labour market transition rates with magnitude and joint behaviour that
are directly estimated from post-war US data. We nd the time-series behaviour of aggregate
precautionary wealth accumulation), they experiences a discontinuous drop in income and consumption when
unemployment strikes. This drop being of rst-order magnitude, changes in the perceived likelihood that it will
occur have a correspondingly rst-order impact on the intensity of the precautionary motive for accumulating
assets ex ante.
3In this case, our economy collapses to a two-agent one of the kind studied by, e.g., Becker and Foias
(1987), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), or Iacoviello (2005). We refer to this situation as the hand-to-mouth
case even when the borrowing limit is not strictly zero since agents then end up consuming their entire
income, including their negative capital income.
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consumption generated by our baseline precautionary-saving model to be much closer to the
data than those implied by the comparable hand-to-mouth and representative-agent models.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the representative-agent limit of our framework generates to little
consumption volatility and too low a consumption-output correlation. More interestingly, the
comparable hand-to-mouth model generates not only too high a consumption-output corre-
lation (due to constrained householdsconsumption tracking their income), but also too little
consumption volatility. By contrast, the precautionary-saving model generates a much higher
level of consumption volatility, because consumption then responds to expected labour-market
conditions (via the precautionary motive) in addition to current labour market conditions
(the key determinant of consumption in the hand-to-mouth case). Time-varying precaution-
ary saving also contributes to relax the tight output-consumption association predicted by
the hand-to-mouth case, without taking it to a level as low as in the representative-agent
case. To complete the picture, we also compare the moments of interest implied by our
baseline precautionary-saving model with those generated by the full-edged heterogenous-
agent model of Krusell and Smith (1998, Section IV). Despite their structural di¤erences,
the Krusell-Smith model and our baseline incomplete-market model predict similar levels of
consumption volatility and consumption-output correlation and those most in line with the
data relative to the alternative specications.
Our analysis di¤ers from earlier attempts at constructing tractable models with incomplete
markets, which typically restrict the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic shocks in ways
that makes them ill-suited for the analysis of time-varying unemployment risk. For example,
Constantinides and Du¢ e (1996) study the asset-pricing implications of an economy in which
households are hit by repeated permanent income shocks. This approach has been generalised
by Heathcote et al. (2008) to the case where householdsincome is a¤ected by insurable tran-
sitory shocks, in addition to imperfectly insured permanent shocks. Toche (2005), and more
recently Carroll and Toche (2011) explicitly solve for householdsoptimal asset-holding rule
in a partial-equilibrium economy where they face the risk of permanently exiting the labour
market. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009) analyse precautionary saving behaviour in a model
with trading frictions a la Lagos and Wright (2005), and show that agentsliquidity hoard-
ing amplify the impact of i.i.d. (aggregate and idiosyncratic) productivity shocks. Relative
to these models, ours allows for stochastic transitions across labour market statuses, which
implies that individual income shocks are transitory (but persistent) and have a conditional
distribution that depends on the aggregate state. The model is thus fully consistent with the
ow approach to the labour market and can be evaluated using direct evidence on the cyclical
4
movements in labour market transition rates.4
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section introduces
the model. It starts by describing householdsconsumption-saving decisions in the face of
idiosyncratic unemployment risk; it then spells out rmsoptimality conditions and charac-
terises the equilibrium. In Section 3, we introduce the parameter restrictions that make our
model tractable by endogenously limiting the dimensionality of the cross-sectional distrib-
ution of wealth. Section 4 calibrates the model and compares its quantitative implications
to the data, as well as to three alternative benchmarks the representative-agent model, the
hand-to-mouth model and the Krusell-Smith model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The model features a closed economy populated by a continuum of households indexed by i and
uniformly distributed along the unit interval, as well as a representative rm. All households
rent out labour and capital to the rm, which latter produces the unique (all-purpose) good
in the economy. Markets are competitive but there are frictions in the nancial markets, as
we describe further below.
2.1 Households
Every household i is endowed with one unit of labour, which is supplied inelastically to the
representative rm if the household is employed.5 All households are subject to idiosyn-
cratic changes in their labour market status between employment and unemployment.
Employed households earn a competitive market wage (net of social contributions), while
unemployed households earn a xed unemployment benet i > 0.6
4Carroll (1992), and more recently Parker and Preston (2005) have suggested that changes in precautionary
wealth accumulation following (countercyclical) changes in the extent of unemployment risk signicantly
amplify aggregate consumption uctuations. This motivates our focus on idiosyncratic and time-varying
unemployment risk as a driver of aggregate savings, a focus that we share with Krusell and Smith (1998).
5Our model ignores changes in hours worked per employed workers, since those play a relatively minor role
in the cyclical component of total hours in the US (see, e.g., Rogerson and Shimer, 2011). Incorporating an
elastic labour supply for employed workers would be a simple extensions of our baseline specication.
6Following much of the heterogenous-agent literature, we focus on (un)employemnt risk as the main source
of idiosyncratic income uctuations at business-cycle frequency. Our model could easily be extended to
introduce wage risk in addition to employment risk (as in, e.g., Low et al. (2010)).
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We assume that households can be of two types, impatient and patient, with the former
and the latter having subjective discount factors I 2 (0; 1) and P 2  I ; 1 and occu-
pying the subinterval [0;
] and (
; 1], respectively, where 
 2 [0; 1). While not necessary
for the construction of our equilibrium with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity below, the
introduction of patient households will allow us to generate a substantial degree of cross-
sectional wealth dispersion, since patient households will end up holding a large fraction of
total wealth in equilibrium.7 However, in contrast to models featuring heterogenous discount
factors wherein impatient households face a binding borrowing limit and hence behave like
mere hand-to-mouthconsumers8, most of the impatient in our baseline model will hold a
wealth bu¤er in excess of the borrowing limit and will thus not face a binding constraint.
As we shall see in Section 4 below, that these households do not behave as hand-to-mouth
consumers crucially matters for the aggregate time-series properties of the model.
Unemployment risk. The unemployment risk faced by individual households is sum-
marised by two probabilities: The probability that a household who is employed at date
t   1 becomes unemployed at date t (the job-loss probability st), and the probability that a
household who is unemployed at date t   1 stays so at date t (i.e., 1   ft, where ft is the
job-nding probability). The law of motion for employment is9
nt = (1  nt 1) ft + (1  st)nt 1: (1)
One typically thinks of cyclical uctuations in (ft; st) as being ultimately driven by more
fundamental shocks governing the job creation policy of the rms and the natural breakdown
of existing employment relationships. For example, endogenous variations in (ft; st) naturally
arise in a labour market plagued by search frictions, wherein both transition rates are a¤ected
by the underlying productivity shocks. We provide a model of such a frictional labour market
in Appendix A.10 However, we wish to emphasise here that the key market friction leading
7Krusell and Smith (1998) introduced heterogenous, stochastic discount factors to generate plausible levels
of wealth dispersion in their incomplete-market environement. Our specication is closer to that in McKay
and Reis (2012) who use heterogenous, but deterministic, discount factors.
8See, e.g., Becker (1980); Becker and Foias (1987); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Iacoviello (2005).
9This formulation is fully constitent with the possibility of unemployment spells shorter than a period
(e.g., a quarter). Assume, for example, that an employed worker at the end of date t  1 looses its job at the
beginning of date t with probability t, but is re-hired during the same period with probability ft. Then, the
period-to-period job-loss probability is st = t (1  ft), while the employment dynamics (1) still holds.
10See also Krusell et al. (2011), who solve numerically a full-edged heterogenous-agent model with incom-
plete insurance and labour market frictions.
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to time-varying precautionary savings is the inability of some households to perfectly insure
against such transitions, a property that does not depend on the specic modelling of the
labour market being adopted. For this reason, we take those transition rates as exogenous in
our baseline specication, and will ultimately extract them from the data in the quantitative
implementation of the model.
Impatient households. Impatient households maximise their expected life-time utility
E0
P1
t=0
 
I
t
uI (cit), i 2 [0;
], where cit is (nondurables) consumption by household i at date
t and uI(:) a period utility function satisfying uI0 (:) > 0 and uI00 (:)  0. We restrict the
set of assets that impatient households have access to in two ways. First, we assume that
they cannot issue assets contingent on their employment status but only enjoy the (partial)
insurance provided by the public unemployment insurance scheme; and second, we assume
that these households face an (exogenous) borrowing limit in that their asset wealth cannot fall
below  , where   0.11 Given these restrictions, the only asset that can be used to smooth
out idiosyncratic labour income uctuations are claims to the capital stock. We denote by eit
households i employment status at date t, with eit = 1 if the household is employed and zero
otherwise. The budget and non-negativity constraints faced by an impatient household i are:
ait + c
i
t = e
i
tw
I
t (1  t) +
 
1  eit

I +Rta
i
t 1; (2)
cit  0; ait   : (3)
where ait is household is holdings of claims to the capital stock at the end of date t, Rt the
ex post gross return on these claims, wIt the real wage for impatient households (assumed to
be identical across them), I the unemployment benet enjoyed by these households when
unemployed, and wIt t a contribution paid by the employed and aimed at nancing the un-
employment insurance scheme.12 The Euler condition for impatient households is:
uI0
 
cit

= IEt
 
uI0
 
cit+1

Rt+1

+ 'it; (4)
11In our model, this constraint will e¤ectively binds only for the households who are both impatient and
unemployed, a small fraction of the population (3.4% in our baseline calibration). The model can accomodate
an endogenous borrowing limit based on limited commitment, e.g., if households pleageable income is a
constant fraction ~ of next periods expected future labour income. This does not signicantly a¤ect our
results provided that pledgeable income is not too volatile. See Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) for an analysis
of how an exogenous change in the tightness of the constraint (as arguably occurred at the oneset of the Great
Recession) a¤ects outcomes under incomplete markets.
12Since households do not choose hours or participation here, it does not matter for aggregate dynamics
whether social contributions are proportional or lump sum.
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where 'it is the Lagrange coe¢ cient associated with the borrowing constraint a
i
t  0, with
'it > 0 if the constraint is binding and '
i
t = 0 otherwise. Condition (4), together with
the initial asset holdings ai 1 and the terminal condition limt!1Et[
Itaitu
I0 (cit)] = 0, fully
characterise the optimal asset holdings of impatient households.
Patient households. Patient households maximise E0
P1
t=0
 
P
t
uP (cit), i 2 (
; 1] ; where
P 2  I ; 1 and uP (:) is increasing and strictly concave over [0;1). In contrast to impatient
households, patient households have complete access to asset markets including the full set
of Arrow-Debreu securities and loan contracts.13 Full insurance implies that these households
collectively behave like a large representative family of permanent-income consumers in
which the family head ensures equal marginal utility of wealth for all its members despite
the fact that individuals experience heterogenous employment histories (see, e.g., Merz, 1995;
Hall, 2009). Since consumption is the only argument in the period utility, equal marginal
utility of wealth implies equal consumption, so we may write the budget constraint of the
family as follows:
CPt + A
P
t = RtA
P
t 1 + (1  
)
 
ntw
P
t (1  t) + (1  nt) P

; (5)
where CPt ( 0) andAPt denote the consumption and end-of-period asset holdings of the family
(both of which must be divided by 1  
 to nd the per-family member analogues), and wPt
and P are the real wage and unemployment benet for patient households, respectively. The
Euler condition for patient households is given by:
uP 0

CPt
1  


= PEt

uP 0

CPt+1
1  


Rt+1

: (6)
This condition, together with the initial asset holdings AP 1 and the terminal condition
limt!1Et[
 
P
t
APt u
P 0  CPt = (1  
)] = 0, fully characterise the optimal consumption path
of patient households. Note that when 
 = 0 then only fully-insured patient households
populate the economy, and the latter become a representative-agent economy.
13Patient households will be more wealthy than impatient households in equilibrium and a lot more so
when we calibrate the model to match the cross-sectional distribution of wealth in the US. Under xed
participation cost to trading Arrow-Debreu securities (as in, e.g., Mengus and Pancrasi (2012)), we expect
households holding more wealth (patient households here) to be more willing to buy insurance, all else equal.
From a quantitative point of view, Krusell and Smith (1998) have argued that the behaviour of wealthy agents
facing incomplete markets and borrowing constraints is almost undistinguishable from that of fully insured
agents. Finally, it is easy to show that in our economy the borrowing constraint would never be binding
for fully-insured patient households in equilibrium, even if such a constraint were assumed in the rst place
(because patient households are relatively wealthy and claims to the capital stock are in positive net supply).
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2.2 Production
The representative rm produces output, Yt, out of capital, Kt; and the units of e¤ective
labour supplied by the households. Let nIt and n
P
t denote the rms use of impatient and
patient households labour input, respectively, and Yt = ztG
 
Kt; n
I
t + n
P
t

the aggregate
production function, where  > 0 is the relative e¢ ciency of patient households labour
(with the e¢ ciency of impatient householdslabour normalised to one), fztg1t=0 a stochastic
aggregate productivity process with unconditional mean z = 1; and where G (:; :) exhibits
positive, decreasing marginal products and constant returns to scale (CRS). As will be clear in
Section 4 below, the introduction of an e¢ ciency premium for patient households (i.e.,  > 1),
which raises their labour income share in equilibrium relative to the symmetric case ( = 1),
is necessary to match the cross-sectional consumption dispersion, for any plausible level of
wealth dispersion.14 Dening kt  Kt=
 
nIt + n
P
t

as capital per unit of e¤ective labour
and g (kt)  G (kt; 1) the corresponding intensive-form production function, we have Yt =
zt
 
nIt + n
P
t

g (kt). Capital depreciates at the constant rate  2 [0; 1], so that investment is
It  Kt+1 (1  )Kt. Given Rt and zt, the optimal demand for capital by the representative
rm satises:
ztg
0 (kt) = Rt   1 + : (7)
On the other hand, the optimal demands for the two labour types in a perfectly competitive
labour market must satisfy ztG2
 
Kt; n
I
t + n
P
t

= wIt = w
P
t =, where w
I
t is the real wage per
unit of e¤ective labour.
2.3 Market clearing
By the law of large numbers and the fact that all households face identical transition rates
in the labour market, the equilibrium numbers of impatient and patient households working
in the representative rm are nIt = 
nt and n
P
t = (1  
)nt, respectively. Consequently,
e¤ective labour and capital are nIt + n
P
t = (
 + (1  
))nt (with nt given by (1)) and
14Although we do not model it explicitly here, that  > 1 is a direct implication of standard human capital
accumulation models, which predict that more patient agents accumulate more human capital in the rst place
(e.g., Ben Porath, 1967). Our underlying assumption of perfect substituability between e¢ cient labour units
is made for simplicity, as it makes the equilibrium wage premium wPt =w
I
t constant and equal to the exogenous
productivity premium . Introducing imperfect substituabilty between labour types (see, e.g., Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011) makes the wage premium a function of the employment levels (nPt ; n
I
t ) but does not alter the
basic mechanisms that we focus on.
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Kt = (
 + (1  
))ntkt, respectively. Moreover, by the CRS assumption the equilibrium
real wage per unit of e¤ective labour is wIt = zt (g (kt)  ktg0 (kt)).
In general, we expect incomplete insurance against unemployment shocks to generate
cross-sectional wealth dispersion, as the asset wealth accumulated by a particular household
depends on the employment history of this household. We summarise this heterogeneity in
accumulated wealth by Ft (~a; e) ; which denotes the measure at date t of impatient households
with beginning-of-period asset wealth ~a and employment status e, and we denote by at (~a; e)
and ct (~a; e) the corresponding policy functions for assets and consumption.15 Since those
households are in share 
 in the economy, clearing of the market for claims to the capital
stock requires that
APt 1 + 

X
e=0;1
Z +1
~a= 
at 1 (~a; e) dFt 1 (~a; e) = (
 + (1  
))ntkt; (8)
where the left hand side of (8) is total asset holdings by all households at the end of date t 1
and the right hand side the demand for capital by the representative rm at date t. Clearing
of the goods market requires:
CPt + 

X
e=0;1
Z +1
~a= 
ct (~a; e) dFt (~a; e) + It = zt (
 + (1  
))ntg (kt) ; (9)
where the left hand side of (9) includes the consumption of all households as well as aggregate
investment, It = (
 + (1  
)) (nt+1kt+1   (1  )ntkt) ; and the right hand side is output.
Finally, we require the unemployment insurance scheme to be balanced, i.e.,
tnt
 

wIt + (1  
)wPt

= (1  nt)
 

I + (1  
) P  ; (10)
where the left and right hand sides of (10) are total unemployment contributions and benets,
respectively.
An equilibrium of this economy is dened as a sequence of householdsdecisions fCPt ; cit;
APt ; a
i
tg1t=0, i 2 [0;
], rms capital per e¤ective labour unit fktg1t=0, and aggregate vari-
ables fnt; wIt ; Rt; tg1t=0, which satisfy the householdsand the representative rms optimality
conditions (4), (6) and (7), together with the market-clearing and balanced-budget condi-
tions (8)(10), given the forcing sequences fft; st; ztg1t=0 and the initial wealth distribution 
Ap 1; a
i
 1;

i2[0;
] :
15Our formulation of the market-clearing conditions (8)(9) presumes the existence of a recursive formulation
of the households problem with (~a; e) as individual state variables, as this will be the case in the equilibrium
that we are considering. See, e.g., Heathcote (2005) for a nonrecursive formulation of the households problem.
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3 An equilibrium with limited cross-sectional hetero-
geneity
As is well known, dynamic general equilibrium models with incomplete markets and borrow-
ing constraints are not tractable, essentially because any households decisions depend on
its accumulated asset wealth, while the latter is determined by the entire history of idiosyn-
cratic shocks that this household has faced. In consequence, the asymptotic cross-sectional
distribution of wealth usually has an innitely large number of states, and hence innitely
many agent types end up populating the economy (Aiyagari, 1994; Krusell and Smith, 1998).
In this paper, we make specic assumptions about impatient households period utility and
the tightness of the borrowing constraint, which ensure that the cross-sectional distribution
of wealth has a nite number of wealth states as an equilibrium outcome. As a result, the
economy is characterised by a nite number of heterogenous agents whose behaviour can
be aggregated exactly, thereby making it possible to represent the models dynamics via a
standard (small-scale) dynamic system. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the sim-
plest equilibrium, which involves exactly two possible wealth states for impatient households.
However, we show in Section 3.3 and Appendix B how this approach can be generalised to
construct equilibria with any nite number of wealth states.
3.1 Assumptions and conjectured equilibrium
Let us rst assume that the instant utility function for impatient households uI (c) is i) con-
tinuous, increasing and di¤erentiable over [0;+1) ; ii) strictly concave with local relative
risk aversion coe¢ cient I (c) =  cuI00 (c) =uI0 (c) > 0 over [0; c], where c is an exogenous,
positive threshold, and iii) linear with slope  > 0 over (c;+1) (see Figure 2). Essen-
tially, this utility function (an extreme form of decreasing relative risk aversion) implies that
high-consumption (i.e., relatively wealthy) impatient households do not mind moderate con-
sumption uctuations i.e., as long as the implied optimal consumption level says inside
(c;+1)but dislike substantial consumption drops those that would cause consumption to
fall inside the [0; c] interval.
Given this utility function, we derive our equilibrium with limited cross-sectional hetero-
geneity by construction; Namely, we rst guess the general form of the solution, and then
verify ex post that the set of conditions under which the conjectured equilibrium was derived
does prevail in equilibrium. Our rst conjecture is that an employed, impatient household is
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su¢ ciently wealthy for its chosen consumption level to lie above c, while an unemployed, im-
patient household chooses a consumption level below c. In other words, we are constructing
an equilibrium in which the following condition holds:
Condition 1 : 8i 2 [0;
] ;
8<: eit = 1) cit > c;eit = 0) cit  c: (11)
As we shall see shortly, one implication of this utility function and ranking of consumption
levels is that employed households fear unemployment, and consequently engage in precau-
tionary saving behaviour ex ante in order to limit (but without being able to fully eliminate)
the associated rise in marginal utility.
Figure 1. Instant utility function of impatient households, uI (c) :
The second feature of the equilibrium that we are constructing is that the borrowing con-
straint in (3) is binding (that is, the Lagrange multiplier in (4) is positive) for all unemployed,
impatient households, so that their end-of-period asset holdings are zero:
Condition 2 : 8i 2 [0;
] ; eit = 0) u0
 
cit

> Et
 
Iu0
 
cit+1

Rt+1

and ait =  : (12)
Equations (11)(12) have direct implications for the optimal asset holdings of employed
households. By construction, a household who is employed at date t has asset wealth aitRt+1
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at the beginning of date t+1. If the household falls into unemployment at date t+1, then the
borrowing constraint becomes binding and the household liquidates all assets. This implies
that the household enjoys consumption
cit+1 = 
I + + aitRt+1 (13)
and marginal utility uI0
 
I + + ait+1Rt+1

.
There are now two cases to distinguish, depending on whether or not this household faces
a binding borrowing constraint at date t (that it, when the household is still employed). If
it does not, then ait >   in (13), i.e., the household has formed a bu¤er of precautionary
asset wealth in excess of the borrowing limit when still employed (with the bu¤er being of
size ait +  > 0). If it does, then a
i
t =   in (13) (so that cit+1 = I    (Rt+1   1)), and the
household had consumed its entire (wage and asset) income at date t.
The precautionary saving case. If the borrowing constraint does not bind at date t, then
ait >   and the following Euler condition must hold at that date:
 = IEt
 
(1  st+1)  + st+1uI0
 
I + + aitRt+1

Rt+1

: (14)
The left hand side of (14) is the current marginal utility of this household, which is equal
to  under condition (11). The left hand side of (14) is expected, discounted future marginal
utility, with marginal utility at date t + 1 being broken into the two possible employment
statuses that this household may experience at that date, weighted by their probabilities of
occurrence (consequently, the expectations operator Et (:) in (14) is with respect to aggregate
uncertainty only). More specically, if the household stays employed, which occurs with
probability 1 st+1, it enjoys marginal utility  at date t+1 (by equation (11)); if the household
falls into unemployment, which occurs with complementary probability, it liquidates assets (by
equation (12)) and, as discussed above, enjoys marginal utility uI0
 
I + + aitRt+1

. Since
equation (14) pins down ait as a function of aggregate variables only (i.e., st+1 and Rt+1), asset
holdings are symmetric across employed households. Formally,
8i 2 [0;
] ; eit = 1) ait = at: (15)
To get further insight into how unemployment risk a¤ects precautionary wealth, it may be
useful to substitute (15) into (14) and rewrite the optimal asset holding equation for employed
households as follows:
IEt
" 
1 + st+1
uI0
 
I + + atRt+1
  

!
Rt+1
#
= 1: (16)
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Consider, for the sake of the argument, the e¤ect of a fully predictable increase in st+1
holding Rt+1 constant. The direct e¤ect is to raise 1 + st+1[uI0
 
I + + atRt+1
   ]=,
since the proportional change in marginal utility associated with becoming unemployed,
[uI0
 
I + + atRt+1
   ]=, is positive (see Figure 1). Hence, uI0  I + + atRt+1 must
go down for (16) to hold, which is achieved by raising date t asset holdings, at. Later on we
derive an approximate asset holding rule that explicitly connects current precautionary asset
wealth to the expected job-loss rate and the expected interest rate.
The hand-to-mouth case. In the case where the borrowing constraint is binding for em-
ployed, impatient households in addition to being binding for the unemployed, as conjectured
in (12), then from (2) the consumption of employed households is wt (1  t)    (Rt   1)
while that of unemployed households is I    (Rt   1). In other words, all impatient house-
holds consume their entire (wage and asset) income in every period. Our model thus nests
the pure hand-to-mouth behaviour as a special case, which occurs when the borrowing
constraint is binding for all impatient households (and not only the unemployed). As we
discuss below, this corner scenario notably arises when i) direct unemployment insurance is
su¢ ciently generous (so that self-insurance is deterred), or impatient householdsdiscount
factor is su¢ ciently low (i.e., households are too impatient to save).
Aggregation. The analysis above implies that, under conditions (11)(12), the cross-sectional
distribution of wealth amongst impatient households at any point in time has at most two
states: exactly two (  and at >  ) if the borrowing constraint is binding for unemployed
households but not for employed households, and exactly one ( ) if the constraint is binding
for all impatient households, employed and unemployed alike. This in turn implies that the
economy is populated by at most four types of impatient households since from (2) the type
of a household depends on both beginning- and end-of-period asset wealth. We call these
types ij, i; j = e; u, where i (j) refers to the households employment status in the previous
(current) date (for example, a ue householdis currently employed but was unemployed in
the previous period, and its consumption at date t is cuet ). These consumption levels are :
ceet = wt (1  t) +Rtat 1   at; (17)
ceut = 
I + +Rtat 1; (18)
cuet = wt (1  t)  at   Rt; (19)
cuut = 
I +   Rt: (20)
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where at is given by (16) in the precautionary-saving case and by   in the hand-to-mouth
case (hence in the latter case ceet = c
ue
t and c
eu
t = c
uu
t ). Finally, denoting by !
ij the number
of impatient households of type ij in the economy at date t, labour market ows imply that
we have:
!eet = 
 (1  st)
 
!eet 1 + !
ue
t 1

; !eut = 
st
 
!eet 1 + !
ue
t 1

; (21)
!uut = 
 (1  ft)
 
!eut 1 + !
uu
t 1

; !uet = 
ft
 
!eut 1 + !
uu
t 1

: (22)
The limited cross-sectional heterogeneity that prevails across impatient households implies
that we can exactly aggregate their asset holding choices. From (12) and (15), total asset
holdings by impatient households is
AIt  

X
e=0;1
Z +1
~a= 
at (~a; e) dFt (~a; e) (23)
= 
 (ntat   (1  nt)) ;
which can be substituted into the market-clearing condition (8). Similarly, aggregating indi-
vidual consumption levels (17)(20) given the distribution of types in (21)(22), we nd total
consumption by impatient households to be:
CIt  

X
e=0;1
Z +1
~a= 
ct (~a; e) dFt (~a; e) (24)
= 

 
ntw
I
t (1  t) + (1  nt) I

+ (Rt   1)AIt 1| {z }
net income
  
 (nt (at + ))| {z }
change in asset wealth
;
where AIt 1 is given by (23) and is the di¤erence operator (so that A
I
t = 
 (nt (at + ))).
Equation (24) summarises the determinants of total consumption by impatient households
in the economy. At date t, their aggregate net income is given by past asset accumulation and
current factor payments and hence taken as given by the households in the current period.
The change in their total asset holdings, 
 (nt (at + )), depends on both the change in the
number of precautionary savers 
nt (the extensiveasset holding margin) and the assets held
by each of them at (the intensivemargin). The former is determined by employment ows
is thus beyond the householdscontrol, while the latter is their key choice variable. In the
precautionary saving case, at is given by (16) and hence rises when labour market conditions
are expected to worsen (i.e., st+1 is expected to fall), which contributes to take CIt down. In
the hand-to-mouth (HTM ) case we simply have at =  , so that AI;HTMt =  
 and
CI;HTMt = 

 
ntw
I
t (1  t) + (1  nt) I    (Rt   1)

; (25)
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implying that only current labour market conditions a¤ect CI;HTMt (via their e¤ect on nt).
Comparing (24) and (25), we get that:
CIt = C
I;HTM
t + 
 (Rtnt 1 (at 1 + )  nt (at + )) :
The latter expression shows how total consumption by impatient households and, by
way of consequence, aggregate consumption itselfdi¤ers across the hand-to-mouth and the
precautionary-saving cases. In the hand-to-mouth case, only current labour market conditions
nt in addition to factor prices (wIt ; Rt)a¤ect total consumption by impatient households.
In the precautionary-saving case, the same e¤ects are at work but, in addition, future labour
market conditions matter inasmuch as they a¤ect at. This suggests that the precautionary
saving model may display more consumption volatility than the hand-to-mouth model, pro-
vided that labour market conditions are su¢ ciently persistent. This will be conrmed in the
quantitative analysis of Section 4 below.
3.2 Existence conditions and steady state
Existence conditions. The equilibriumwith limited cross-sectional heterogeneity described
so far exists provided that two conditions are satised. First, the postulated ranking of con-
sumption levels for impatient households in (11) must hold in equilibrium. Second, unem-
ployed, impatient households must face a binding borrowing constraint (see (12)).
 From (17)(20) and the fact that at    (with equality in the hand-to-mouth case),
we have cuut  ceut and ceet  cuet . Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for (11) to
hold is ceut < c
 < cuet , that is,
I + + at 1Rt < c < wIt (1  t)  at   Rt: (26)
 Unemployed, impatient households can be of two types, uu and eu, and we require both
types to face a binding borrowing constraint in equilibrium. However, since cuut  ceut
(and hence uI0 (cuut )  uI0 (ceut )), a necessary and su¢ cient condition for both types to
be constrained is
uI0 (ceut ) > 
IEt(
 
ft+1u
I0 (cuet ) + (1  ft+1)uI0
 
cuut+1

Rt+1);
where the right hand side of the inequality is the expected, discounted marginal utility
of an eu household who is contemplating the possibility of either remaining unemployed
(with probability 1 ft+1) or nding a job (with probability ft+1). Under the conjectured
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equilibrium we have uI0 (cuet ) =  and c
uu
t+1 = 
I +  (1 Rt+1), so the latter inequality
becomes:
uI0
 
I + + at 1Rt

> IEt
  
ft+1 + (1  ft+1)uI0
 
I +  (1 Rt+1)

Rt+1

: (27)
In what follows, we compute the steady state of our conjectured equilibrium and derive
a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (26)(27) to hold in the absence of aggregate
shocks. By continuity, they will also hold in the stochastic equilibrium provided that the
magnitude of aggregate shocks is not too large.
Steady state. In the steady state, the real interest rate is determined by the discount rate
of the most patient households, so that R = 1=P (see (6)). From (1) and (7), the steady
state levels of employment and capital per e¤ective labour unit are
n =
f 
f  + s
; k = g0 1

1
P
  1 + 

: (28)
A key variable in the model is the level of asset holdings that employed, impatient house-
holds hold as a bu¤er against unemployment risk. If the borrowing constraint is binding
in the steady state, then they never hold wealth. The interior solution to the steady state
counterpart of (16) (where R = 1=P ) gives the individual asset holdings:
~a = P

uI0 1



1 +
P   I
Is

  I   

: (29)
The borrowing constraint is binding whenever the interior solution ~a in (29) is less than
 . Hence the actual steady-state wealth level of employed, impatient households is given
by:
a = max [ ; ~a] ; (30)
which nests both the precautionary-saving and hand-to-mouth cases discussed above.
Equations (29)(30) are informative about the conditions under which the economy col-
lapses to a hand-to-mouth economy. More specically, employed, impatient households form
no bu¤er stock of wealth whenever ~a <  , that is, using (29)(30) and rearranging, when-
ever
P   I
I
> s  u
0  I +   =P   

: (31)
This inequality is straightforward to interpret. In the hand-to-mouth case, the steady state
consumption level of an impatient household who is transiting into unemployment is I + 
=P that is, the unemployment benet I plus new borrowing  minus the debt repayment
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 at the gross interest rate 1=P . Thus, the right hand side of (31) is the proportional cost in
terms of marginal utilityassociated with a completely unbu¤ered transition from employment
(where marginal utility is ) to unemployment (where marginal utility is u0
 
I +   =P ),
weighted by the probability of this transition occuring (the job-loss probability s). The
higher the probability of this transition, the stronger the incentive to bu¤er the shock and
the less likely (31) will hold, all else equal. Conversely, the higher the unemployment benet
I , the lower the actual cost of the transition when it occurs, the weaker the incentive to
hold a bu¤er stock, and the more likely (31) will hold; formally, a
 
I

is a nonincreasing,
continuous piecewise linear function with a kink at the value of I for which ~a =   in (29)
see Figure 2. Finally, the left hand side of (31) measures the relative impatience of impatient
households; the more impatient they are, the less willing to save and the more likely (31) will
hold.
Figure 2. Unemployment insurance and precautionary saving.
Finally, from (8) and (23), steady state (total) asset holdings by impatient and patient
households are AI = 
 (na   (1  n)) and AP = (
 + (1  
))nk   AI; respec-
tively, where n, k and a are given by (28) and (30). The wealth share of the poorest 
%
one of our calibration targets belowis thus:
AI
K
=

 (na   (1  n))
(
 + (1  
))nk (32)
The other relevant steady state values directly follow, notably the total consumption levels
of patient and impatient households, and the consumption share of the bottom 
% another
calibration target, CI=
 
CI + CP

.
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We may now state the following proposition, which establishes the conditions on the deep
parameters of the model under which a steady state with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity
exists. Provided that aggregate shocks have su¢ ciently small magnitude, the same conditions
will ensure the existence of a stochastic equilibrium with similarly limited heterogeneity.
Proposition 1. Assume that i) there are no aggregate shocks, ii) unemployment insurance
is incomplete (i.e., I < wI (1   )) and iii) the following inequality holds:


1 +
P   I
Is

>
max

I
P

f + (1  f)u0

I   

1
P
  1

; u0

wI (1   ) + P I
1 + P
  

1
P
  1

;
where
  =

1  n
n


I + (1  
) P
(
 + (1  
))wI ; (33)
wI = g (k)  kg0 (k) ; and (n; k) are given by (28). Then, it is always possible to nd a
utility threshold c such that the conjectured limited-heterogeneity equilibrium described above
exists. In this equilibrium, a =   (a >  ) if (31) holds (does not hold).
Proof. First, the steady state counterpart of (27) is
a < PuI0 1

I
P

f + (1  f)u0

I + 

P   1
P

  P  I +  : (34)
Second, the steady state counterpart of (26) is I + + a=P < c < wI (1  t)  a  
=P . A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a threshold c is thus that I + + a=P <
wI (1  t)  a   =P , or
a <
P 
1 + P
  ; (35)
where    wI (1   )   I = (1   ) [g (k)  kg0 (k)]   I is a strictly positive constant
that only depends on the deep parameters of the model (see (28) and (33)). Inequalities
(34)(35) hold for a =   (the hand-to-mouth case). Otherwise, a is given by (29) (the
precautionary saving case); substituting this value of a into (34)(35) and rearranging gives
the inequality in the proposition
The inequalities in Proposition 1 ensure that, in the steady state, i. the candidate equi-
librium features at most two possible wealth levels for impatient households (  for the
unemployed and a    for the employed); and ii. the implied ranking of individual con-
sumption levels is indeed such that we can reverse-engineeran instant utility function for
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these households of the form depicted in Figure 1. Those inequalities can straightforwardly be
checked once specic values are assigned to the deep parameters of the model. As we argue in
Section 4 below, it is satised for plausible such values when we calibrate the model to the US
economy. The reason for which it does is as follows. Our limited-heterogeneity equilibrium
requires that impatient, unemployed households be borrowing-constrained (i.e., they would
like to borrow against future income but are prevented from doing so), while impatient, em-
ployed households accumulate su¢ ciently little wealth in equilibrium (so that this wealth be
exhausted within a quarter of unemployment). In the US, the quarter-to-quarter probability
of leaving unemployment is high and the replacement ratio relatively low, leading the unem-
ployeds expected income to be su¢ ciently larger than current income for these households
to be willing to borrow. On the other hand, the US distribution of wealth is fairly unequal,
leading a large fraction of the population (the impatient in our model) to hold a very small
fraction of total wealth.
Linearised asset holding rule. We conclude this section by stressing that, in case em-
ployed, impatient households do form precautionary saving, local time-variations in the prob-
ability to become unemployed, st+1, have a rst-order e¤ect on precautionary asset accumu-
lation at the individual level, at. This is because even without aggregate risk a change in
employment status from employment to unemployment at date t+ 1 is associated with a dis-
continuous drop in individual consumption, and hence with a infra-marginal rise in marginal
utility from  to uI0 (ceu) > .16 The probability st+1 weights this possibility in employed
householdsEuler equation (see (16)), so even small changes in st+1 have a sizeable impact on
asset holdings and consumption choices. Linearising (16) around the steady state calculated
above, we nd the following approximate individual asset holding rule:
at ' a +  sEt (st+1   s) +  REt (Rt+1  R) ;
with
 s =
 
P   I  P  I + + a
(P   I (1  s)) sI (ceu) > 0;
16This property distinguishes our model from those which root the precautionary motive into households
prudence (Kimball, 1990). In that framework, time-variations in precautionary savings may follow from
changes in the second-order term of future marginal utility (see, e.g., Gourinchas and Parker, 2001; Parker and
Preston, 2005). It is apparent from (16) that a mean-preserving increase in employed householdsuncertainty
about future labour income taking the form of an increase in st+1 (and a corresponding rise in wt+1 to keep
expected income constant) raises asset holdings the usual denition of precautionary saving.
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and where a is given by (29), ceu = I +  + aR is the steady state counterpart of (18),
and I (ceu)   ceuuI00 (ceu) =uI0 (ceu) is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of impatient
households evaluated at ceu (i.e., the steady state consumption level of a household falling
into unemployment). The composite parameter  s measures the strength of the response of
individualsprecautionary wealth following predicted changes in unemployment risk, such as
summarised by the period-to-period separation rate st+1.17
3.3 Equilibria with multiple wealth states
In the previous sections, we have constructed an equilibrium with limited cross-sectional
heterogeneity characterised by the simplest (nondegenerate) distribution of wealth, that with
two states. A key feature of this equilibrium is that impatient households face a binding
borrowing constraint after the rst period of unemployment and hence liquidate their entire
asset wealth. As we argue next, instant asset liquidation by wealth-poor households is a
natural outcome of our framework when we calibrate it on a quarterly basis and using US
data on the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. However, we emphasise that the same
approach can be use to construct equilibria with any nite number of wealth states, wherein
households gradually, rather than instantly, sell assets to o¤set their individual income fall.
We carefully derive in Appendix B a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of limited-heterogeneity equilibria with m + 1 wealth states (that
is, m strictly positive wealth states), thereby generalising the constructive approach used in
Sections 3.13.2. As before, we focus on those conditions at the steady state, and resort to
perturbation arguments to extend them to the stochastic equilibrium. An equilibrium with
m + 1 wealth states has the property that the only impatient households facing a binding
borrowing constraint are those having experienced at least m consecutive periods of unem-
ployment. Before the mth unemployment period, the asset wealth and consumption level of
these households decreases gradually. From the m+ 1th unemployment period, these house-
holds face a binding borrowing constraint, hold no wealth, and have a at consumption path.
Finally, we show that an equilibrium with m + 1 wealth states is associated with 2 (m+ 1)
types of impatient households (that is, the cross-sectional distribution of consumption has
2 (m+ 1) possible states).
To see this intuitively how this gradual process of asset decumulation can occur in our
17 R may be positive or negative depending on the relative strengths of the intertemporal income and
substitution e¤ects. In particular, high values of I produce asset accumulation rules that prescribe an
increase in at following a fall in Et (Rt+1) :
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framework, consider for simplicity the case where  = 0 and consider the steady state of the
simple equilibrium described above and take its existence condition with respect to the bind-
ingness of the borrowing constraint for an impatient households who fall into unemployment:
uI0
 
I + aR

> I
 
f  + (1  f )uI0  IR ; (36)
where I+aR is the consumption of those households under full liquidation,  their marginal
utility in the next period if they exit unemployment, and I their consumption in the next
period if they stay unemployed (with no assets left, by construction).
The circumstances leading to the violation of inequality (36), so that the equilibrium with
two wealth states described above no longer exists, are the following. First, the job-nding
rate f  or the unemployment benet I may be too low, leading to high marginal utility
in the next period (the right hand side of (36)), thereby urging the household to transfer
wealth into the future. Second, the asset holdings accumulated when employed (a, which is
itself determined by (29)) may be too high, leading to low current marginal utility (the left
hand side (36)), thereby making this transfer little costly to the household. However, even if
inequality (36) is violated for one of these reasons, a similar condition might nevertheless hold
for households having experienced two consecutive periods of unemployment, because those
have less wealth (and hence higher current marginal utility) than in the rst unemployment
period. In this case, the equilibrium will have exactly three wealth states (including two
strictly positive), rather than two.
4 Time-varying precautionary saving and consumption
uctuations
The model developed above implies that some households rationally respond to countercyclical
changes in unemployment risk by raising precautionary wealth and thus by cutting down
individual consumption more than they would have done without the precautionary motive.
We now wish to assess the extent of this e¤ect on aggregate consumption when realistic
unemployment shocks are fed into our model economy. To this purpose, we compute the
response of aggregate consumption and output to aggregate shocks implied by our baseline
model, and then compare it with the data as well as a number of comparable benchmarks
including i. the hand-to-mouth model, ii. the representative-agent economy, and iii. Krusell
& Smith (1998) stochastic-betaeconomy.
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4.1 Summary of the baseline precautionary-saving model
We start by writing down the dynamic system summarising the behaviour of our baseline
precautionary-saving model, at the level of aggregation that is relevant for the quantitative
exercises that follow. The model includes three forcing variables (zt; ft and st) and nine
endogenous variables, namely: employment and capital per e¤ective labour unit, nt and kt;;
the total consumption of impatient and patient households, CIt and C
P
t ; the corresponding
asset levels, i.e., APt for the representative family and at for an employed, impatient household;
the factor prices Rt and wIt ; and the unemployment contribution rate, t. These endogenous
variables are linked through the following equations:
IEt
" 
1 + st+1
 
uI0
 
I + + atRt+1
  

!!
Rt+1
#
= 1; (EE-I)
CIt + A
I
t = 

 
ntw
I
t (1  t) + (1  nt) I

+RtA
I
t 1; (BC-I)
AIt = 
 (ntat   (1  nt)) ; (A-I)
PEt
 
uP 0
 
CPt+1= (1  
)

uP 0 (CPt = (1  
))
Rt+1
!
= 1; (EE-P)
CPt + A
P
t = (1  
)
 
ntw
I
t (1  t) + (1  nt) P

+RtA
P
t 1; (BC-P)
Rt = ztg
0 (kt) + 1  ; (IR)
wIt = zt (g (kt)  ktg0 (kt)) ; (WA)
APt 1 + A
I
t 1 = (
 + (1  
))ntkt; (CM)
tntw
I
t (
 + (1  
)) = (1  nt)
 

I + (1  
) P  ; (UI)
nt = (1  nt 1) ft + (1  st)nt 1: (EM)
Equations (EE-I)(A-I) are the Euler condition and aggregate budget constraint for im-
patient households where (BC-I)(A-I) are just (23)(24). Equations (EE-P)(BC-P) are
the same conditions for patient households, such as given by (5)(6) and where wPt has been
replaced by its equilibrium value, wIt . (IR) follows from the representative rms optimal-
ity condition (7), with the factor price frontier under CRS giving wIt in (WA). Equation
(CM) is the market-clearing condition for capital, which follows from substituting (23) into
(8). Finally, (UI) is the balanced-budget condition for the unemployment insurance scheme
(where again wPt = w
I
t has been substituted into (10)), while (EM) is the law of motion for
employment.
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4.2 Alternative benchmarks
In what follows, we shall compare the time-series properties of our baseline precautionary
saving model with the following alternative benchmarks.
Hand-to-mouth model. As discussed in Section 3, the hand-to-mouth model arises en-
dogenously as a particular case of our framework whenever (31) holds (and aggregate shocks
have su¢ ciently small magnitude). In this equilibrium all impatient households face a binding
borrowing constraint in every period, so that at =   for all t. The dynamics of the hand-to-
mouth model is obtained by removing equation (EE-I) from the dynamic system (EE-I)-(EM)
above and by imposing at =   in equation (A-I).
Representative-agent model. Our framework also nests the representative-agent model
as a special case. The comparable representative-economy is obtained by setting 
RA = 0
so that all households are identical and perfectly insuredand RA = 
 + (1  
) so that
average labour productivity is kept the same as in the baseline precautionary-saving model.
The subjective discount factor P is kept at the same value as in the baseline model, so that
the steady state interest factor R = 1=P ; and hence capital per e¤ective labour unit k,
are unchanged. Since steady-state total wealth is (
 + (1  
))nk (see (8)), it takes the
same value in the representative-agent model as in the baseline precautionary-saving model
(and also the hand-to-mouth model).
Krusell-Smith model. We also compare the quantitative implications of our model with
the stochastic-beta version of the Krusell and Smith (1998) heterogenous-agent model. We
thus simulate exactly the same model and then compute the moments that we wish to com-
pare to those implied by our baseline model with limited cross-sectional heterogeneity.18 Our
motivation for focusing on the stochastic-beta version of the model is twofold. First, it incor-
porates discount factor heterogeneity which, as our model, potentially generates a substantial
amount of cross-sectional wealth dispertion (as is usually observed empirically, notably in the
US). Second, the stochastic-beta model is the Krusell-Smith variant that di¤ers most from the
full-insurance model in term of the consumption-output correlation, one of the key moments
we are also interested in (see Table 2 in Krusell and Smith, 1998).
18We refer the reader to their paper for the description of their model and results (and notably Section 4
for the stochastic-beta model).
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4.3 Calibration
We set the time period to a quarter (and thus allow unemployment spells to be shorter than
a period see footnote 7), and calibrate the model so that its steady state matches some key
features of the cross-sectional distributions of wealth and consumption in the US economy
(see Table 1 below). We then simulate the model to infer its its time-series properties under
this calibration as well as alternative specication (as summarised in Table 2).
Idiosyncratic risk and insurance The extent of idiosyncratic risk that households face
is measured by the labour market transition rates (f ; s at the steady state), while the
degree of insurance that they enjoy depends on both the replacement ratio I=wI and the
borrowing limit : The steady state values of f  and s are set to their quarter-to-quarter
post-war averages (see Appendix C for how quarterly series for ft and st are constructed). By
construction, these values produce a steady-state unemployment rate s=(f  + s) also equal
to its post-war average, 5.65%.
In a narrow sense, the gross replacement ratio j=wj; j = I; P; measures the replacement
income provided by the unemployment insurance scheme and should thus be set between 0.4
and 0.5 for the US (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005; Chetty, 2008). However, households also benet
from other, nonobservable sources of insurance family, friends etc.We take this into account
by calibrating j=wj so as to generate a plausible level of consumption insurance. Cochrane
(1991) argues that the average nondurable consumption growth of consumers experiencing
an involuntary job loss is 25 percentage point lower than those who do not. Gruber (1997)
focuses on the impact of UI benets on the size of the consumption fall of households having
experienced a job loss, and nd a signicantly smaller number about 7 percent. We set our
baseline gross replacement ratio j=wj to 0.6 (rather than, say, 0.5) which, together with
the other parameters of the model, produces a consumption growth di¤erential of 14.08% for
the average households;19 we also evaluate the impact of a larger replacement ratio in our
sensitivity experiments.
In the model, only the households who are both impatient and hence have little assets in
the rst placeand unemployed face a binding borrowing constraint. In our baseline scenario,
19Patient households are fully insured and hence experience noconsumption fall when falling into unem-
ployemnt. Hence, the average proportional consumption drop associated with falling into unemployment is

 (ce   ceu) =ce, where ce  f (1  n) cue + (1  s)ncee is the average consumption of and employed,
impatient households. Our calibrated replacement ratio being perfectly symmetric across households, we are
implicitly ignoring the potential redistributive e¤ects of the unemployemnt insurance scheme.
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we simply assume that these househoulds cannot borrow (i.e.,  = 0), and then evaluate the
impact of a relaxation of this constraint in our sensitivity analysis.20 As we shall see, relaxing
the borrowing within a plausible range signicantly a¤ects the cross-sectional distribution of
wealth but not the time-series implications of the model.
Preferences. On the householdsside, we adopt the following baseline parameters. We set
the share of impatient households, 
, to 0.6 (and experiment with an alternative value of
0.3 in our sensitivity analysis); since only a fraction 1  n of such households face a binding
borrowing constraint in the baseline precautionary-saving model, and given the calibrated
steady-state transition rates f  and s (see above), this implies a steady-state share of ef-
fectively borrowing-constrained households of 
 (1  n) = 3:4%.21 The discount factor of
patient household, P (= 1=R), is set to 0.99, and their instant utility to uP (c) = ln c.
The utility function of impatient households is set to
uI (c) =
8<: ln c for c  1:6ln 1:6 + 0:486 (c  1:6) for c > 1:6;
which satises the assumptions in Section 2.1 (with  = 0:486 and c = 1:6). The chosen value
of  is equal to the steady state marginal utility of ee households (by far the most numerous
amongst the impatient) if they had the same instant utility function as patient households 
given the other parameters, and is meant to minimise di¤erences in asset holding behaviour
purely due to di¤erences in instant utility functions.22 Note that uI (c) is continuous and
(weakly) concave but not di¤erentiable all over [0;1) (since uI0 (1:6) > 0:486); however, it
can be made so by smooth pastingthe two portions of the function in an arbitrarily small
neighbourhood of c while preserving concavity. We set the discount factor of impatient
households, I , to match the wealth share of the 
% poorest households, given the other
parameters including P . We focus on nonhome (or liquid) wealth, since our analysis
20Sullivan (2008) nds the response of (unsecured) individual debt to unemployment shocks to be inexistent
or very small (a tenth of the associated income loss) in the US.
21Model with rule-of-thumbconsumers usually have a larger fraction of e¤ectively constrained households,
ranging from 15% to 60% (see, e.g., Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Iacoviello, 2005; Gali et al., 2007; Mertens
and Ravn, 2011; Kaplan and Violante, 2012). In the hand-to-mouth economy, the share of e¤ectively con-
strained household is raised from (1  n) 
 (= 3:4%) to 
 (= 60%) (since all impatient households, including
the employed, are then constrained).
22More specically,  solves  = uP 0 (cee) =
 
wI + a
 
1  1=P  1 : This equation indicates that the
appropriate value of  depends on a. Since a also depends on  (by (29)), we jointly solve for the xed
point (a; ) using a iterative procedure.
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pertains to the the part of householdsnet worth that can readily be converted into cash to
provide for current (nondurables) consumption. A value of I = 0:9697 produces a wealth
share of 0.30% for the 60% poorest households (the AI=K ratio in (32)), which matches the
corresponding quantile of the distribution of nonhome wealth in the 2007 Survey of Consumer
Finances (see Wol¤, 2011, Table 2).23
Technology. On the production side, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = ztK

t
 
nIt + n
P
t
1 
, with  = 1=3, and a depreciation rate  = 2:5%. The produc-
tivity premium parameter  on patient householdslabour is set to 1.731. Since impatient
households productivity is normalised to 1, this implies an equilibrium skill premium of
73.1%). Given the other parameters (see below), this will produce a consumption share
CI=(CI+CP) of 40.62% for the 60% poorest households, which exactly matches the cross-
sectional distribution of nondurables in the 2009 Consumer Expenditure Survey.24 Note that
this value is also well in line with the direct evidence on the level of the skill premium such
as reported in, e.g., Heathcote et al. (2010) or Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
Our baseline parameterisation is summarised in Table 1. Given those parameters, and
in particular the implied low wealth share of impatient households, the existence conditions
summarised in Proposition 1 are satised (by a large margin). In particular, households who
fall into unemployment without enjoying full insurance exhaust their bu¤er stock of wealth
within a quarter, and thus live entirely out of unemployment benets thereafter. Given the
baseline values of 
 and , the representative-agent economy (i.e., in which 
RA = 0) must be
parametrised with a skill premium parameter RA = 
+(1  
) = 0:6+0:41:731 = 1:292:
Finally, from (31) the calibrated model becomes a hand-to-mouth model whenever the steady
state gross replacement ratio for impatient households, I=wI; exceeds 0.694.
23According to Gruber (1998), the mean probability of selling ones home for those who become unemployed
is only 3% that is, households typically do not sell their home to smooth nondurables consumption. Besides
the net ownership of the primary residence, the nonhome wealth distribution reported in Wol¤ (2011) excludes
consumer durables (whose resale value is low) as well as the social security and pension components of wealth
(which cannot be marketed). See Wol¤ (2011) for a full discussion of this point.
24Our empirical couterpart for the consumption share of impatient households is the share of nondurables
consumed by the bottom three quintiles of households in terms of pre-tax income, where we dene nondurables
as in Heathcote et al. (2010).
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Parameters Symb. Value Steady state (%) Value Data Source
Share of impatient hous. 
 :6 Unemployment rate 5:65 5:65 CPS
Disc. factor (patient) P :99 Liquid wealth share of
Disc. factor (impatient) I :9697 bottom 
% 0:30 0:30 SCF
Replacement ratio =w :6 Consumption share of
Borrowing limit  :0 bottom 
% 40:62 40:62 CEX
Skill premium parameter  1:731 Mean cons. fall after
Capital share  1=3 unemployment shock 14:08 [7; 25] See text
Depreciation rate  :025
Job-nding rate f  :789
Job separation rate s :047
Table 1. Baseline model: parameters and implied steady state.
Note: The model matches the mean unemployment rate by construction. Iand  are set to that
the wealth and consumption shares of the model (column 5) match their empirical counterparts
(column 6), given the other parameters of the model (see text for details).
4.4 Aggregate consumption volatility
Experiment. We compute the second-order moment properties of the various specica-
tions under consideration, focusing on the implied volatility of aggregate consumption and
its correlation with output (see Table 2). For the three variants of system (EE-I)(EM) un-
der consideration (that is, the precautionary-saving model, the hand-to-mouth model and
the represetative-agent model), we proceed as follows. We rst estimate the joint behav-
iour of the exogenous state vector over the entire postwar period, using a four-lag VAR
Xt =
P4
j=1AjXt j + "t, where Xt =
h
~ft; ~st; ~zt
i0
includes the HP-ltered job-nding rate, job-
separation rate and log-TFP, and where "t is the 1  3 vector of residuals; this gives us Aj;
j = 1:::4 as well as the covariance matrix   Var ("t) (see Appendix C for details.). We then
log-linearise the three model variants and solve for their VAR representation Zt = BZt 1 +Xt,
where Zt is the relevant vector of endogenous variables.25 Last, we run stochastic simulations
of each models with repeated shocks on Xt that have the same stochastic properties (in terms
of autocorrelation and innovationscovariance structure) as those estimated from the data. In
each case, the standard deviation of consumption Std(C) the average proportional deviation
25Our results are almost identical when we consider second-order approximations of each model under
consideration.
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from trend, in %is computed, as well as its correlation with output, Corr(Yt; Ct).
As discussed above, we also compare these moments with those implied by the stochastic-
beta, Krusell and Smith (1998) model.26 Because that model is not tractable, it has a single,
two-state exogenous state variable which a¤ects both total factor productivity and labour-
market transition rates. This is in contrast with the other three stochastic experiments
described above, which use a somewhat richer structure of aggregate shocks (namely, the
estimated joint behaviour of transition rates and total factor productivity). Since we are
simulating the same model, our value of Corr(Yt; Ct) in Table 2 below exactly replicates theirs
(see Krusell and Smith, 1998, Table 2, p. 886). We also compute the wealth share of the 60%
poorest as well as the standard deviation of aggregate consumption; in the later calculation,
the simulated consumption series is loged and HP-ltered (with smoothing parameter 1600)
before computing the standard deviation, so that the latter is comparable with those generated
by the other models (which are expressed in percent deviation from trend).
Results. The top part of Table 2 reports, for each model under consideration (Model 2 to
5), the wealth share of the poorest 
% (in the baseline scenario where 
 = 0:6) as well as the
second-order moments under investigation, and compare them with the data (Row 1). The
bottom part of Table 2 carries out a number of sensitivity experiments around the baseline
precautionary-saving model
The two models that are closest to the data are the baseline precautionary-saving model
(Model 2) and the Krusell-Smith model (Model 4). As argued above, Model 2 has been
parameterised to match the empirical share of liquid wealth held by the poorest 60% hence
the identity between the two in the Table (=0.30); in contrast, Model 4 was parameterised
by Krusell and Smith (1998, Section IV) to t the Lorenz curve for net worth; since net
worth is less unequally distributed than liquid wealth, it generates a greater corresponding
wealth share than does Model 2. As is extensively discussed in Krusell and Smith (1998), the
wealth distribution in Model 4 implies that a large fraction of the households are reasonably
well self-insured against idiosyncratic shocks, implying that their behaviour is close to that
of pure permanent-income consumers; this shows up here as a smaller consumption volatility
generated by Model 4 relative to Model 2.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the comparable representative-agent economy (Model 5) gener-
ates far too much consumption smoothing, which shows up here in the very low values of
both the standard deviation of aggregate consumption and its correlation with output. More
26We simulated 10 000 households for 11 000 periods and discarded the rst 1 000 periods.
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interestingly, the hand-to-mouth model (Model 3) also underestimates the volatility of con-
sumption but overestimates its correlation with output, relative to both the data (rst row)
and the two incomplete-market economies (Models 2 and 4). The rst feature was discussed
in Section 3.1 above (see equations (24) and (24)): because impatient households hold no pre-
cautionary wealth in Model 3, current individual wealth is entirely unresponsive to changes
in future labour market conditions, while it does under time-varying precautionary savings.
Incomplete markets and time-varying precautionary savings are thus key in generating high
level of consumption volatility relative to the simpler hand-to-mouth economy, thereby tak-
ing the model much closer to the volatility of aggregate consumption that is observed in the
data. The second feature of the hand-to-mouth model its high implied output-consumption
correlation is mechanical: since Model 3 has a large fraction of the household consuming
their current income in every period, aggregate consumption closely tracks aggregate income.
Economies Statistics (%)
Wealth
share of
bott. 
%
Std(C) Corr(Y;C) Corr(Y; Y  1)
1. Data :30 :86 80 84
2. Precautionary-saving model :30 :78 75 79
3. Hand-to-mouth model :00 :59 96 79
4. Krusell-Smith model 5:5 :72 82 82
5. Representative-agent model irr. :38 50 80
Sensitivity

 
I
wI  
I 
2. :6 :6 1:73 :970 :0 :30 :78 75 79
2a. :3 :6 1:73 :970 :0 :13 :48 75 80
2b. :6 2=3 1:73 :970 :0 :09 :79 75 79
2c. :6 :6 1:00 :970 :0 :39 :97 73 79
2d. :6 :6 1:73 :975 :0 :50 :72 81 79
2e. :6 :6 1:73 :970 I -1:75 :77 75 79
Table 2. Summary statistics.
Note: Models 1, 2, 3 and 5 are simulated according to the estimated joint process for (ft; st; zt).
Model 4 is simulated as in Krusell and Smith (1998, Sec. IV). See text for details.
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Sensitivity. The bottom part of Table 2 focuses on our baseline precautionary-saving model
(Model 2), and reports the sensitivity of the moments under consideration with respects to
changes in the share of impatient household (
, Model 2a), the replacement ratio (j=wj;
j = I; P , Model 2b), the skill premium parameter (, Model 2c), the subjective discount
factor for impatient households (I ; Model 2d), and the borrowing limit (, Model 2e)
Models 2a and 2b correspond to economies which are closer to the representative-agent
model than our baseline specication, and hence where market incompleteness plays a more
limited role in driving the response of consumption to aggregate shocks. In Model 2a, the
share of impatient households is reduced; unsurprisingly, the greater proportion of permanent-
income consumers in this specication implies a lower aggregate consumption volatility and
a lower correlation with output, relative to the baseline model. In Model 2b, the number
of impatient households is maintained at its baseline value, but these households are en-
dowed with better insurance opportunities; namely, the steady state gross replacement ratio
is raised to the value 2/3 (instead of 0.6), while social contributions still adjust (upwards)
to satisfy the balanced-budget condition (10). While this value of the replacement ratio is
still consistent with positive asset holdings by impatient households (that is, the economy
remains a precautionary-saving one), the implied greater level of direct insurance crowds out
self-insurance and hence substantially raises wealth dispertion. Aside from this di¤erence, the
second-order moment properties of the model are close to those of Model 2.
In Model 2c, the heterogeneity in labour e¢ ciency across patient and impatient house-
holds that was assumed in the baseline specication is removed. Since all households earn
the same wage, wealth is slightly more equally distributed. More importantly, this speci-
cation overestimate the consumption of the 60% poorest in the population, as those end up
consuming 53% total consumption (not reported in Table 2), against 41% in the data (see
Table 1). Since the consumption of impatient consumpers responds more to aggregate shocks
than that of patient (i.e., permament-income) consumers, the composition e¤ect leads to an
overestimation of volatility of consumption. Model 2d is one in which impatient households
are more patient than in the baseline specication, and consequently hold a larger fraction of
total wealth; the volatility properties of that specication are close to those of the baseline
specication and very close to the Krusell-Smith model. Finally, in Model 2e the borrowing
limit which was set to zero in the baseline specicationis relaxed. Recall in the baseline
precautionary-saving model (Model 2) only unemployed, impatient households face a binding
borrowing limit; here we impose that these householdscan borrow up to the amount of the
unemployment benet I . In this economy, even though the employed do hold a bu¤er stock
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of wealth in excess of the borrowing limit, this amount of wealth is negative; consequently, im-
patient households as a whole end up holding a negative fraction of total wealth. Aside from
this cross-sectional di¤erence, the time-series properties under study are almost unchanged
relative to Model 2.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a tractable general equilibrium model of householdsbehav-
iour under incomplete insurance and time-varying precautionary savings, and then gauged
its ability to shed light on the dynamics of aggregate consumption over the business cycle. In
contrast to earlier attempts at constructing tractable versions of models with heterogenous
agents, the specicity of ours has been to combine i. a realistic representation of households
labour income risk modelled as resulting from the combined e¤ects of persistent changes
in the equilibrium real wage and in the probabilities to transit across employment statuses;
and ii. the reduction of the models dynamic to a small-scale system solved under ratio-
nal expectations, thanks to exact cross-household aggregation. Finally, the model has been
calibrated to match the broad features of the cross-sectional wealth and consumption disper-
tions that are observed in the US economy, and then fed with joint productivity and labour
market shocks such as estimated from post-war data. Despite its simplicity, the model was
found to do a fairly reasonable job at explaning the time-series behaviour of aggregate con-
sumption. In particular, the comparision with the pure hand-to-mouthmodel reveals that
time-variations in precautionary savings may signicantly raise consumption volatility, even
though the individual wealth of precautionay savers (as a share of aggregate liquid wealth) is
low on average.
While this paper has deliberately focused on a simple model specication (by drastically
limiting the number of household types) and quantied its most direct implication (the implied
time-series properties of aggregate consumption), the tractability of our framework may be
useful other contexts. For example, it can easily be used to interact incomplete markets
with other frictions (e.g., nominal rigidities, labour market frictions) that are widely believed
to matter for the business cycle. Moreover, it can handle a potentially large number of
state variables with continuous support, which is empirically attractive (e.g., for structural
estimation).
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Appendix
A. Endogenous transitions rates
This appendix shows how (ft; st) can be determined by the job creation policy of the rm
in a labour market with search and matching frictions. We use the same timing convention
and employment contract as in Hall (2009), which allows us to be as close as possible to our
baseline model with exogenous transition rates. Moreover, for expositional conciseness we
assume that  = 1 (i.e., all households are equally productive), but the argument directly
extends to the case where  6= 1.
More specically, our timing is as follows. At the very beginning of date t, a fraction
 of existing employment relationships are broken, thereby creating a job seekerspool of
size 1   (1  )nt 1 (that is, unemployment at the end of date t   1; 1   nt 1, plus the
broken relationships at the beginning of date t; nt 1). Members of this pool then have a
probability ft to nd a job within the same period, and stay unemployed until the end of the
period with complementary probability. It follows that the period-to-period separation rate
is st =  (1  ft) :
The job-nding rate, ft; is determined as follows. Given its knowledge of 1  (1  )nt 1
and zt, the representative rm posts vt vacancies at cost c > 0 each and a fraction t of which
are lled in the current period. Total employment at the end of date t is thus:
nt = (1  )nt 1 + tvt: (37)
The vacancy lling rate t is related to the vacancy opening policy of the rm via the
matching technology. The number of matches Mt formed at date t is assumed to depend on
both the size of the job seekerspool and the number of posted vacancies, vt, according to
the function Mt = M (1  (1  )nt 1; vt) ; which is increasing and strictly concave in both
arguments and has CRS. Thus, the vacancy-lling rate satises t = Mt=vt = m (t), where
t  vt= (1  (1  )nt 1) is the market tightness ratio, and where the function m (t) 
M
 
 1t ; 1

is strictly decreasing in t.
Once matched, the households and the rm split the match surplus according to bilaterally
e¢ cient dynamic contracts that are negotiated at the time of the match and implemented as
planned for the duration of the match. Following Hall (2009) and Stevens (2004), we restrict
our attention to a simple class of dynamic contracts whereby the rm pays the worker its full
marginal product, except at the time of the match when the worker is paid below marginal
product. The prot ow extracted by the rm on new matches motivates and nancesthe
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payment of vacancy opening costs, but existing matches generate no quasi-rents thereafter.
Formally, this arrangement is equivalent to a fee contract in which any matched worker i
enjoys the wage wt = ztG2 (Kt; nt) at any point in time but pays a xed fee  t > 0 to the
rm at the time of hiring; that is, the worker is actually paid ~wt = wt    t > 0 during the
(one-period) probation time and the full wage thereafter. We let  t respond to the aggregate
state, i.e.,  t =  (zt),  0 (:) > 0. The representative rm maximises its instantaneous prot
ow
t = ztG (Kt; nt)  ntwt   (Rt   1 + )Kt + vt (t t   c) ; (38)
subject to (37), and taking nt 1; t, Rt, as well as the contract ( ~wt; wt), as given. The optimal
choice of capital per employee is given by equation (7). On the other hand, from (38) the rm
expands vacancy openings until ztG2 (Kt; nt)t twt+t t c = 0: Since ztG2 (Kt; nt) = wt
in the class of contracts under consideration, the economywide vacancy-lling rate that results
from these openings is:
t = c= (zt)   (zt) ; 0 (:) < 0: (39)
From (38)(39) and the CRS assumption, the rm makes no pure prots in equilibrium
(i.e., old matches generate no prot, while the quasi-rent extracted from new matches is
exhausted in the payment of vacancies costs). From the matching function specied above,
the tightness ratio that results from the optimal vacancy policy of the rm is t = m 1 (t) :
Hence, the job-nding rate in this economy is:
ft = t:m
 1 (t)  f (zt) ; f 0 (:) > 0; (40)
and the job separation rate is s (zt) =  (1  f (zt)) : Note that under this structure the rms
problem is static and thus unambiguous despite the fact that impatient and patient households
do not share the same pricing kernel.
B. Equilibria with many wealth states
In this Appendix, we use the same constructive approach as in the body of the paper in order to
derive a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibria
with many wealth states. We derive these conditions at the steady state (which as before
satises R = 1=P ; (28) and (33)), knowing that those will still hold in the vicinity of the
steady state provided that aggregate shocks are not too large. More specically, we generalise
our approach to construct equilibria having the following properties: i) given a period utility
function for impatient households with the shape depicted in Figure 1, i) all unemployed
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household consume less than c; ii) all employed households consume more than c; iii) none
of the employed face a binding borrowing constraint; and iv) unemployed households do face
a binding borrowing constraint after m < 1 consecutive periods of unemployment (that is,
asset liquidation takes place gradually rather than in one period, but is achieved in nite
time). For expositional clarity we focus on the case where  = 0 (i.e., the unemployed cannot
borrow), but the argument can straightforwardly generated to the case where  > 0:
Let us call k-unemployed householdsthose who are unemployed for exactly k  1 con-
secutive periods at date t (and thus who were still employed at date t   k). For example,
1-unemployed households are unemployed at date t and but were employed at date t 1. Sim-
ilarly, we denote by k-employed householdsthose employed at date t who where unemployed
from date t   k   1 to date t   1. By extension, 0-employed households are those employed
date t who were also employed at date t  1.
Conjecture that i) all k-unemployed households consume the same amount cuk and hold
the same asset wealth, denoted ak; ii) all employment households hold the same asset wealth,
denoted a0; and iii) all k-employed households consume the same amount cek. We will show
that it is indeed the case in equilibrium. By assumption, the period utility function has the
following property:
u (c) =
8<: ~u (c) if c  c~u (c) +  (c  c) if c > c (41)
Moreover we assume that ~u is di¤erentiable and strictly concave, with ~u0 (c) >  for all c < c
and limc!0+ ~u0 (c) = +1. Finally, we assume that:
 < IR

(1  s)  + s~u0  I (42)
We will rst characterize the equilibrium wealth distribution when (42) holds. Then we
will show that when it does not, then all impatient households face a binding borrowing limit
and hence simply behave like rule-of-thumbconsumers.
Consumption and asset levels. Under our conjectured equilibrium, the Euler equations
determining the distribution of wealth are:
 = I [(1  s)  + s~u0 (cu1)]R; (43)
~u0 (cuk) = 
I

f  + (1  f ) ~u0  cuk+1R if m  2 and for k = 1:::m  1; (44)
where (43) is the Euler equation for employed households and (44) are the Euler equations for
unemployed households before the borrowing constraint starts binding. From the households
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budget constraints, the consumption levels of unemployed households are
cuk = 
I + ak 1R   ak if m  2 and for k = 1:::m  1; (45)
cum = 
I + am 1R; (46)
cuk = 
I for k > m; (47)
while those of employed households are
cej = w
 (1   ) + ajR   a0 for j = 0; :::m (48)
The conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with m+ 1 wealth states can be stated
as follows:
cek > c
 > cuj for all k  0 and j  1; (49)
ak > 0 for k  0; (50)
~u0 (cum) >  [f
 + (1  f ) ~u0 ()]R: (51)
Inequality (49) ensures that the ranking of consumption levels is consistent with the as-
sumed instant utility function. Inequality (50) states that asset holdings are positive before
the constraint binds. Equation (51) states that the borrowing constraint is binding after m
periods of unemployment. We now derive a set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
equations (43)(51) to hold, thereby implying the existence of an equilibrium with limited
cross-sectional heterogeneity. Moreover, we will show that when this equilibrium exist, then
it is unique.
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. To establish existence and uniqueness,
we rst construct a function F (m; am 1) that depends on the number of liquidation periods
for unemployed households before the constraint binds (m) and the last strictly positive
wealth level before the constraint binds (am 1). If the borrowing constraints binds after m
consecutive periods of unemployment, then we know that am = 0. In words, for every possible
m, F is dened over all possible values of am 1. The goal is to use F to show that both m
and am 1 are unique given the deep parameters of the model. To construct F , note that from
(44) and (45) we have
~u0
 
cum 1

= I

f  + (1  f ) ~u0  I + am 1RR:
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Using (44) m  2 times to eliminate cum 1, cum 2 and cu2 , and then (43) to eliminate cu1 , we
obtain:

IR (1  s)  1  + sf   IR2 m 2X
k=0
 
IR (1  f )k! (52)
+
 
IR
  
IR (1  f )m 1 su0  I + aum 1R = 0
The previous equality is valid for m  2. If m = 1, one can directly use (43) to nd a0,
which corresponds to the baseline case analysed in the body of the paper.
Lemma 1 Dene the function F : N]  =R; +1[! R, such that
F (1; x)  IRs~u0  I + xR  1  IR (1  s) 
and, for m  2,
F (m;x)  s
f 
 
IR
2
1  IR (1  f )  

1  IR (1  s)  (53)
+ sIR

~u0 ( + xR)  f
IR
1  IR (1  f )
  
IR (1  f )m 1 :
Then, for any m  1; am 1 satises F (m; am 1) = 0:
The function F is obtained by factorising the left hand side of (52), and it only depends
on the deep parameters of the model. The following lemma uncovers some useful properties
of F .
Lemma 2 If (42) holds then
i) F is strictly decreasing in both argument
ii) For all m  1, there exists a unique xm 1 such that F (m;xm 1) = 0. Moreover, the series
xm 1 is strictly decreasing in m and we have x0 > 0 and limm!1 xm 1 =  I=R.
Proof. i) We rst note that ~u0
 
I + xR
  IRf
(1 IR(1 f)) > 0, since 1 > 
IR and ~u0 (:)  :
Using this inequality, the expression for F (1; x) above and equation (53) withm = 2, we have
F (1; x) > F (2; x) :Moreover, for allm  2 and x >  I=R we have F (m  1; x) > F (m;x),
that is, F (m;x) is strictly decreasing in m. Finally, F (m;x) is decreasing in x for all m
because ~u0 < 0. ii) Note rst that limx! I=R F (m;x) = +1 for all m  1. Moreover,
(42) implies that F (1; 0) = IRs~u0
 
I
   1  IR (1  s)  < 0. Since F (1; x) is
continuous and monotonic in x, by the theorem of continuous functions there is an x0 such
that F (1; x0) = 0. Now, since F (m;x0) is decreasing in m we have F (2; x0) < 0; and, since
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F (2; x) is continuous and monotonic in x, there exists a unique x1 such that F (2; x1) = 0.
Then, by induction it is easy to show that F (m;xm 2) < 0; and that, for all m  1; there
exists a unique xm 1 such that F (m;xm 1) = 0. Since F (m;x) is strictly decreasing in both
argument, the series xm 1 dened by F (m;xm 1) = 0 is decreasing in m. Finally, using (53),
one nds that F (m;xm 1) = 0 is equivalent to
~u0
 
I + xm 1R

=
1
sR
 
[1  R (1  s)]    s
f  (R)2
1  R (1  f )
!
1
(R (1  f ))m 1
+
f R
1  R (1  f ) (54)
The right hand side of this equation goes to +1 as m goes to +1. Since limc!0+ ~u0 (c) =
+1, this implies that xm 1 !  I=R as m! +1.
Using the properties of F , we may prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium, provided that
the latter exists.
Proposition 2. If there exists an equilibrium with limited heterogeneity, then it is unique.
Moreover, borrowing constraints bind after a nite number of consecutive periods of unem-
ployment.
Proof. Dene
m = maxfmjxm 1  0g, (55)
that is, m is the largest m for which xm 1 is nonnegative. Since xm 1 is strictly decreasing,
x0 > 0 and limm!+1 xm 1 =  I=R, m is nite and uniquely dened. We now show (by
contradiction) that if there exists an equilibrium with limited heterogeneity, then the borrow-
ing constraint must be binding after exactlym consecutive periods of unemployment. Suppose
that there is also an equilibrium in which households face binding borrowing constraints after
n 6= m consecutive periods of unemployment. Then n would satisfy F (n; an 1) = 0. First, it
is impossible that n > m, since in this case we would have an 1 < 0, a contradiction. Second,
if we could nd n < m then we would have F (m; am 1) = F (n; an 1) (= 0). Rearranging
this equality, it can be shown that it would imply that if the borrowing constraint binds after
n consecutive periods of unemployment then am 1 < 0, a contradiction again. Thus, the only
possible equilibrium is such that m = m, where m is nite.
We now characterize the equilibrium allocation with m liquidation periods.
Lemma 3 In an equilibrium with limited heterogeneity, i) cuk is strictly decreasing in k =
1:::m; and ii) aj is strictly decreasing in j = 0:::m   1
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Proof. i) is proven by induction. From (44), if ~u0 (cuk) > f=
 
1=IR   1 + f ; then
~u0
 
cuk+1

> ~u0 (cuk) and hence c
u
k+1 < c
u
k. Now, from (43) we have
~u0 (cu1) =

1 +
1= (R)  1
s

:
Since IR < 1, we know that ~u0 (c1) > ; and since f=
 
1=IR   1 + f < 1, it implies that
~u0 (c1) > f=
 
1=IR   1 + f. ii) For m = 1, then from (42) we have a0 > 0. For m = 2;
since cum 1 = 
I+am 2R am 1 > cum = I+am 1R we have am 2 > am 1 (1 + 1=R) >
am 1. For m  3, we again reason by induction. First, am 2 > am 1; for the same reason
as when m = 2. Second, if am 2 > am 1 then am 3 > am 2; Indeed, from (45)-(47) and
the fact that cuk 1 > c
u
k, k = 0; :::m
   1 we have am 3   am 2 > (am 2   am 1) =R.
We may then construct the states of the wealth distribution as follows. Given m in (55),
the sequence fam igm

i=0 is given by am = 0; am 1 that solves F (m
; am 1) = 0; and then
the recursion
~u0
 
I +Rak 2   ak 1

(56)
= I

f  + (1  f ) ~u0  I +Rak 1   akR if m  2 and for 2  k  m
until a0. This recursion also allows us to nd a0 as a function of the deep parameters of the
model. Indeed, dene the function G and net dis-saving Xk as follows:
G (X) = ~u0 1
 
IR

f  + (1  f ) ~u0  I +X  I ; (57)
Xk  Rak 1   ak: (58)
Then, (56) can be written as Xk 1 = G (Xk) for k = 2::m. Iterating this equation gives:
Xk = G
(m k) (Ram 1) for k = 1:::m   1;
where G(i) is the i-th iteration of G: The aks are then recovered from (58). In particular,
a0 =
m 1X
j=1
G(j) (Ram 1)
(R)j
+
am 1
(R)m
 1 ; a1 =
m 2X
j=1
G(j) (Ram 1)
(R)j
+
am 1
(R)m
 2 (59)
We can now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If w (1   )   a0 > c >  + Ra0   a1; where a0 and a1 are given (59).
Then, the equilibrium with reduced heterogeneity exists and is unique.
Proof. We have shown that if (42) holds, then there is a unique m and a unique sequence
cuk, k = 1:::m such that the Euler equations (43)(44) hold and the borrowing constraint is
39
binding afterm continuous periods of unemployment. For this allocation to be an equilibrium
with limited heterogeneity, one has to show that the ranking of consumption levels (49) is
satised. Since both cuk and ak are decreasing in k, c
e
j in (48) is decreasing in j. Hence, a
su¢ cient condition for the postulated ranking of consumption levels to hold is cem > c
 > cu1 ,
which is equivalent to w (1   )  a0 > c >  +Ra0   a1. If this last condition hold, then
the allocation fcuk ; akgk is the unique equilibrium.
Construction of the period utility function. Taking a utility function ~u and a coe¢ cient
, we can now state the conditions under which one can construct an equilibrium with limited
cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Proposition 4. For a given function ~u, di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave and
with limc!0+ ~u0 (c) = +1 and a given  > 0, one can construct an increasing and concave
utility function u such that a limited heterogeneity equilibrium exists provided that
i) w (1   )  a0 >  +Ra0   a1;
ii) ~u0 ( +Ra0   a1)  ,
where a0 and a1 are given by (59).
Indeed, if i) holds, then one can nds a c such that w (1   ) a0 > c > +Ra0 a1.
One may then construct a utility function u di¤erentiable all over [0;1) by smooth-pasting
~u (:) with the linear part of u (:) in an arbitrarily small neighborhood of c. The function u
can be (weakly) concave provided that ii) holds.
C. Data
In Section 4, we use quarterly time series for real GDP and consumption, as well labour
market transition rates and total factor productivity over the period 1948Q1-2011Q1.
Real GDP is from the NIPA tables, while the real aggregate consumption series is obtained
by dividing nominal spending on nondurable goods and services by the PCE price index (all
from the NIPA tables). To compute the relevant statistics (row datain Table 2), the cycle
component of both series are extracted by HP-ltering the log of the series (with smoothing
parameter 1600).
For the labour-market transition probabilities, we proceed as follows. First, we compute
monthly job-nding probabilities using CPS data on unemployment and short-run unemploy-
ment, using the two-state approach of Shimer (2005, 2012). (As suggested by Shimer, 2012,
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the short-run unemployment series is made homogenous over the entire sample by multiplying
the raw series by 1.1 from 1994M1 onwards). We then compute monthly separation prob-
abilities as residuals from a monthly ow equation similar to (1). Using these two series,
we construct transition matrices across employment statuses for every month in the sample,
and then multiply those matrices over the three consecutive months of each quarter to ob-
tain quarterly transition probabilities (this naturally implies that cyclical uctuations in the
quarter-to-quarter separation rate partly reect changes in the underlying monthly job-nding
rate probability).
Finally, our series for total factor productivity is computed as in Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-
Llopis (2010). When estimating the joint behaviour of TFP and labour market transition
probabilities, all three series are HP-ltered with penalty parameter 1600.
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